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THE THREE OFFICIAL CHOICES
NOTES ON THE 1982 GENERAL ELECTION IN SOLO*
John Pemberton
Historical events often seem more important to their witnesses than 
they do to historians who judge them later. When this thesis was 
completed in September 1972 it still appeared to me that the election 
it describes was a major landmark in the consolidation of the Suharto 
government and I thought that the enormous social problems appar­
ently ignored by Suharto would not prevent his administration from 
surviving for many years. Now as I write in the wake of the January 
1974 demonstrations that rocked Djakarta, the solidity of the New 
Order appears to have been a very ephemeral thing indeed and divi­
sions within the armed forces in particular have been laid bare. Few 
Indonesians would wager that another twenty years will be given to 
the New Order to carry out its programme of accelerated moderni­
zation.
Ken Ward, The 1971 Election in Indonesia1
The first signs of the 1982 Indonesian national election in Solo's neighbor­
hoods were the concentrated efforts of local teenage boys removing motorcycle 
mufflers and the sudden appearance of hundreds of campaign posters. This was 
one morning in mid March. Within hours, the streets of the small but densely 
populated Central Javanese city of one-half million buzzed in anticipation of the 
April political campaigns leading up to election day, May 4. Thus began the third 
in a series of general elections completed by Suharto's New Order government.
The Setting
Like the preceding elections of 1971 and 1977, the 1982 election would focus 
on membership of the national parliament, although local provincial and municipal 
legislative bodies would be chosen at the same time. Three official choices were 
slated numerically: 1) PPP (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan), the Muslim "United 
Development Party"; 2) Golkar (Golongan Karya), the Suharto government's so- 
called "Functional Group"; and 3) PDI (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia), the "Indone­
sian Democratic Party," a partial fusion of Sukarno revivalists and Christian 
politicians. There was absolutely no doubt that Golkar would win the election, 
just as it had in the past with 62.8 percent of the national vote in 1971, and 62.1 
percent in 1977.2
* I would like to thank Jim Siegel and Ben Anderson for their comments on an 
earlier draft of this article.
1. Ken Ward, The 1971 Election in Indonesia: An East Java Case Study (Clayton: 
Monash University Centre of Southeast Asian Studies, 1974), p. vii.
2. The real weight of these wins becomes apparent in light of the make-up of
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2The immense Golkar had been engineered by the Suharto government for the 
1971 general election, the first election held under the New Order government, 
some sixteen years after the Sukarno government had held the first general 
election in Indonesian history in 1955. Describing the 1971 election, Masashi 
Nishihara noted the new feel of a New Order election:
A comparison of these elections with those of 1955, the only 
other national elections held in Indonesia, would not prove very 
meaningful, since the two elections were held under very different 
circumstances. The 1955 elections saw some forty political parties 
and groups freely campaigning for legislative seats, while in 1971 the 
participating groups were limited to ten parties including the govern­
ment's Golkar. The Communist Party (PKI), generally regarded as the 
largest party by late 1957, has been banned since 1966. The youngest 
voter in 1955, who would then have been 18 years old, was 34 years 
old in 1971, and voters between 17 and 33 years old in 1971 cast 
ballots for the first time in their lives.
Thus, in studying the 1971 elections, it is appropriate to empha­
size the means by which the Suharto government tried to organize its 
electoral victory rather than the manner in which the Indonesian 
voter responded to the election campaign. 3
A key logic by which the Suharto regime organized its 1971 and subsequent 
victories is reflected in the politically ambivalent nature of the term "Golkar." 
Although designed to participate actively in, and "win" New Order Elections, 
Golkar was not defined as a "political party," but rather as a "group" (golongan) 
of "functional occupations" (karya). Under the long reach of its "protective" 
banyan tree emblem, Golkar encompassed a wide range of civil servant function­
aries. Implicitly, however, Golkar commanded a large majority of New Order 
voter-subjects who felt obliged to identify with their local ruling administrators, 
hence the Suharto government, and in turn, the Indonesian Armed Forces that 
support it. At bottom, a vote for Golkar appeared to be a vote for "government" 
itself.
In the 1971 election design, nine officially designated "political parties" 
(partai politik) were slated to run against Golkar. At that time, however, the 
word "politik" was marked by a sinister, and for many, frightening tonality 
acquired following the hundreds of thousands of "political" killings—expressed in 
New Order terms as "anti/pro PKI"—which accompanied Suharttfs rise to power in 
1965-66. Thus, the 1971 "political parties" were suspects cast as potential threats 
to the new national stability. Promoted as a commanding alternative to party 
politics, Golkar emerged, by definition, as the apolitical choice.
the national parliament (DPR). Leo Suryadinata notes: "The grip on Indonesian 
politics by the military-dominated government can be seen in the composition of 
the DPR. . . . The national DPR consisted of 460 members, 360 of which were 
elected, while 100 were appointed (25 civilians and 75 military) by the government 
(President). The structure clearly favoured the government." Leo Suryadinata, 
Political Parties and the 1982 General Election in Indonesia (Singapore: Institute 
of Southeast Asian Studies, 1982), p. 7. Of the total 460 (elected and appointed) 
seats, the military government controlled 327 in 1971 and 332 in 1977. All voting 
tabulations in this article are taken from Suryadinata.
3. Masashi Nishihara, Golkar and the Indonesian Elections of 1971 (Ithaca: 
Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 1972), p. 3.
3The force of the New Order’s "apolitical" politics was expressed in a series of 
campaign regulations prepared for the 1971 election. Under PP 1/1971, criticism 
of the government or its officials was banned. Moreover, any "discrediting" of 
organizations, including political groups, was strictly forbidden. Writing on the 
1971 election in East Java, Ken Ward summed up the situation: "The whole burden 
of these regulations was that the election and the campaign would be held in an 
absolutely security^guaranteed, indeed antiseptic atmosphere, devoid of political 
content, of political or ideological dispute, and even of social or political differ­
ences." ♦ A correlative set of regulations fell directly on the candidates them­
selves. Thorough screening procedures, administered both by local committees and 
by the Kopkamtib (Command of the Operation for the Restoration of Security and 
Order, a security body established by Suharto in 1965), determined a candidate's 
acceptability by disqualifying those deemed a threat to national security. Again, 
Ward summed up:
for hundreds and thousands of East Javanese . . . Golkar was almost 
the only organization guaranteeing prestige in official society, the 
chance of a political career (albeit under military guidance in an 
avowedly apolitical atmosphere), and offered the prospect of remuner­
ative employment. At best, joining Golkar could bring access to the 
sympathetic ear of the Kodim commander; at worst, remaining in a 
party, or joining one, brought official displeasure and suspicion. 5
By 1977, the political party structure had again been altered by the Suharto 
government, which consolidated and reduced the nine formal parties of 1971 to 
two: PPP, the new officially approved Muslim party, and PDI, a potentially nostal­
gic, Sukarno-tinged party. Substantially domesticated by New Order political 
strategy, the two parties now functioned as a convenient reminder of all that New 
Order security was fabricated against: the state politics of "Islam" on the one 
hand, and the rhetorics of "Revolution" on the other. Positioned as choice 
Number Two on the ballots, Golkar appeared all the more a "neutral" alternative 
to the "extremist" tendencies of party politics. The successful staging of the 1977 
election demonstrated that the Suharto government was anything but the "ephem­
eral thing" that Ward and many other analysts had anticipated during the open 
protests of the mid 1970s. Rather than undermine New Order solidity, the 1974 
demonstrations provided yet another opportunity for the Suharto regime to display 
its commitment to security. The 1977 election brought this home by presenting a 
nationwide public event in which New Order security was, in effect, commemo­
rated.
*  *  *
The 1982 general election fell right on schedule, exactly five years after 
the 1977 event was completed. The youngest voters of 1955 were now approach­
ing their fifties, while students of the activist "'66 Generation" were drifting into 
their forties. Juxtaposed to the noticeable youth of most campaigners, these 
updated calculations assumed a new significance in 1982. For the majority of 
voters, the now familiar Pemilu (from Pemilihan Umum, General Election) was 
customarily won by Golkar and termed a suks'es (literally, success). For many, 
Golkar's sukses(es) formed the whole of their electoral memory, all the way back
4. Ward, 1971 Elections in Indonesia, p. 14. My summary of the 1971 election 
owes much to Ken Ward's perceptive analysis.
5. Ibid., p. 84.
4to childhood. During the 1971 election, the strategy behind the Suharto regime’s 
transformation of the noun "sukses" into the transitive verb mensukseskan ("to 
success") was still visible: the government’ s campaign command to Mensukseskan 
Pemilu meant to "Golkar" the election. However, by 1982 "sukses" had a history; 
victory was assumed. Now Mensukseskan Pemilu meant, in a twisted sense, to 
"secure" a victory already scored. 8 If Golkar meant "government," Golkar sukses 
meant "election." Government officials matter-of-factly noted that elections were 
held regularly "in order that the requirements of ’demokrasi’ be fulfilled."
Perhaps due to Pemilu’s almost ceremonial regularity, the government felt 
moved to declare the 1982 general election a ”P6sta D6mokrasi,n a striking phrase 
translated by the foreign press as "Festival of Democracy." Strange as this 
translation may sound, "Pesta Demokrasi" is in fact an even stranger image for 
democratic elections. Rather than refer to "festival" (which carries its own 
highly celebratory, at times carnivalesque, semantic force), the Indonesian— 
especially Central Javanese Indonesian—term "pesta" usually refers to formal 
receptions regularly tied to public ceremonies and domestic rituals. Thus, the 
ideal 1982 election scene envisioned by the New Order government was that of, 
say, a Javanese-Indonesian ceremonial wedding reception where guests are ushered 
to socially predesignated seats to act as entertained but quiet witnesses for an 
event executed with close to perfect predictability—as well as, perhaps, a hint of 
festivity. Nearly untranslatable, "Pesta Demokrasi" sounds a little like a "Formal 
Democracy Reception."
It was in this spirit that President Suharto addressed the opening ceremonies 
of the National Conference of Governors, District Chiefs, and Mayors in February 
1981 in preparation for Pemilu ’82: "We must perceive the General Election as a 
grand 'pesta demokrasi,' as a use of democratic rights which is responsible and 
absolutely not turned into something that makes us tense and holds us in its 
clutches. " 7 By March 1982, the official formula, "We must perceive the General 
Election as a pesta demokrasi," had been repeated religiously throughout the New 
Order bureaucracy, down to the lowest level. Central Javanese administrators felt 
it their duty to act as responsible local hosts for what came to be thought of as 
an upacara nasional, a national rite. One unusually enthusiastic low-ranking 
Solonese official even beamed in anticipation of what he imagined would be an 
"upacara kolosal."
From the very beginning of the 1982 campaigns in Solo, Golkar’s posters were 
virtually indistinguishable from government billboards calling on the public to 
Mensukseskan Pemilu *82. Golkar handouts cautioned that the election was not a 
goal in itself, but rather "an education in national politics." In front of all local 
administrative offices stood a Golkar placard which read:
The Victory of Golkar guarantees material and spiritual happiness.
The Golkar family deeply respects Religion and a belief in God.
The Golkar family is always disciplined, orderly, and polite.
The Form that best fits workers, businessmen, and people of 
culture is Golkar.
Golkar honors the sacrifices of national Heroes.
6. I am indebted to Ben Anderson for the "secure" suggestion.
7. Lembaga Pemilihan Umum, Buku Pelertgkap II Pemilihan Umum 1982 (Jakarta, 
1983), pp. 39-40.
5With these five themes, its standard proclamations on the good of Development 
(Pembangunan) and the need for Security (Keamanan), its regal emblem of the 
protective banyan tree, and its invitation to join in the Pesta Demokrasi, Golkar 
controlled most of Solo's visible space.
Toward the end of March, however, signs of the two "political parties" began 
to emerge with new posters, many in Javanese rather than Indonesian. Menyang 
Mekah Munggah Kaji, Nyoblos KA'BAH Tentreming Ati (Go to Mecca and Make 
the Haj, Vote KA'BAH [Mecca's shrine and PPP's emblem] for Peace at Heart). 
Aku emoh dipekso (I ain't gonna be forced) captioned a comic-book hero choosing 
PDI. Lines became more hard hitting as "anticorruption" slogans attached to PPP 
and PDI posters implicitly stuck to Suharto with his Golkar. Soon, poster politics 
gave way to graffiti warfare. "Hotel Banteng"—the banthhng or wild bull was 
PDI’ s emblem—appeared above one underpass used for shelter by homeless 
itinerants, "Ka'bah Station" above another. Solo had become a rising sea of 
political script.
Because the campaign posters appeared around entrances of the hundreds of 
small roads and alleys which open into Solo's neighborhood life, they seemed to 
identify a neighborhood as, say, PDI; but this identification was actually super­
fluous. Most everyone already knew local voting histories: the few massive 
neighborhoods of the powerful mosques, old textile centers, and "Arab" quarters 
were PPP; the poorest neighborhoods at the city’s edge, particularly those near 
the bus terminal, garbage dump, and river bank, as well as a few Christian blocks 
went PDI; and all the rest was Golkar.
The place for campaign life, for real political movement, was not the neigh­
borhood, but the streets, especially Solo's long main street, Slamet Riyadi. Here, 
campaign billboards competed with one another, alongside Indonesian ad signs and 
Kung Fu and Charles Bronson banners featuring movies like Love Massacre, to 
form the graphic background for campaign action. By late March, every after­
noon attracted well over a thousand demufflered lOOcc Yamahas and Suzukis that 
screamed past neighborhoods in tight formations of a dozen or so, sometimes 
alone daredeviling in and out of traffic, occasionally en masse. All revved their 
engines in cadence, 1-2-123-, as if sounding the designated campaign numbers in 
composite sequence. All were headed for Slamet Riyadi to drag its legendary 
length, spin off at top speed through side streets towards the city's edge, and 
regroup to do it again. "Ah, it's the campaign!" retorted an old man with a sort 
of bemused complacency. The sound alone signaled politics; something was in 
gear.
The Events
Sunday April 4 brought Solo its first full-scale political, rally in a campaign 
schedule which allotted one Sunday to each of the parties during the first three 
weeks of April. The final weekend was saved for three successive days of cam­
paigning packed back-to-back just before the Minggu Tenang (Week of Quiet) 
which directly preceded the May 4 election day. For the opening rally Slamet 
Riyadi was lined with parked b6cak positioned as a temporary and overstuffed 
grandstand, with kids on shoulders straining to see what would happen, and with 
hawkers making a quick killing (before the rains set in) on soft drinks, toys that 
move, and an arsenal of noisemakers. As the first group of this Sunday's Golkar 
cycles raced past, riders standing and displaying two fingers for Number Two as 
well as for Victory, police pressed the spectators back. Then came open trucks, 
the large kind used for transporting sugar cane, livestock, or army troops, one
6after another hauling more Golkar supporters, banners, and loudspeakers proclaim­
ing, in so many words, Development. Small army vans took position at each 
major intersection. The sheer noise and pressure of crowding recalled the annual 
maleman (night fair) in Solo; but the fact that this enormous "night fair" was 
taking place in broad daylight gave it an uneasy feel, as did the overriding sense 
that all were watching as if anticipating something that might happen.
Without warning, PPP trucks appeared, carrying amplified Hidup Ka'bah (Long 
Live Ka'bah) and index fingers pointed skyward for Number One and His suprem­
acy. There had been a campaign scheduling mix-up which placed both Golkar and 
PPP on Slamet Riyadi, face to face. As if summoned by the first drops of rain, 
army troops and police moved quickly towards the crowds of spectators, the great 
bulk of whom, equally fast, split. Within minutes several truckloads of Golkar 
men emptied into the streets, hurling threats, then rocks at the PPP marchers 
who responded, though clearly outnumbered. The brief clash was almost over 
with PPP scattering, when a large group of motorcyclists, this time PDI, arrived 
and joined PPP. Now there were real blows, wounding some, several probably 
seriously. The remaining Golkar men ran for refuge in the luxury class Hotel 
Cakra. As an ambulance pulled up, PPP trucks and PDI cycles took off. Several 
hundred reassembled spectators, many of whom had joined in behind the PPP-PDI 
side just moments ago, stood in the street and stared at a pair of armed soldiers 
posed on the corner nearest the hotel. One of the army men began fiddling with 
his rifle, then shouted hoarsely, almost as if threatened: "What are you looking 
at? The street is for going somewhere. Go!" That is all it took; the crowd did 
not disobey.
By early the next morning most of Solo had heard of the peristiwa, the 
incident, the Hotel Cakra Incident. A Golkar cycle had been hit by a PPP cycle 
and this triggered a clash which left three PDI followers dead, it was said, in 
front of Hotel Cakra. If it had not rained, Solo would have ignited. This was 
the rumor that swept through the warung, the hundreds of tiny food stalls and 
gossip stands which appear, each with its own lamp-glow attraction, along the 
city streets and dim alleyways of Solo at night. This rumor triggered others, in 
much the same way that the normally insignificant motorcycle collision in front of 
Hotel Cakra was said to have set off what followed. Thus, it was added that on 
the night of March 27, PPP headquarters in nearby Yogya were attacked by a 
group of armed Golkar men. One of the five PPP officials inside could not 
escape and was said to have been hacked up—his nose and legs cut off and the 
remains thrown into a well. Police reportedly ordered that the body be buried 
immediately, to prevent stories. The next day, memorial services had been held 
for the PPP victim at a local mosque in Yogya; that night PPP followers ripped 
down hundreds of Golkar campaign posters. This story of mass retaliation 
recalled, in turn, other stories, often including the well-known March 18 Lapangan 
Banteng Incident in Jakarta when an apparent conflict between PPP campaigners 
and those of Golkar at a central Golkar rally touched off an incident which 
destroyed cars, buses, shops, and offices, ending in over three hundred arrests. 
If this had occurred in Solo, it was figured, it would have spread, "like fire," all 
over Java.8
From the warung stories there emerged one phrase, one Javanese word, which 
repeatedly recalled the sound of persons rushing forward, drawn into what might
8. For Tempo's version of the Yogya story, see its April 3, 1982 issue, p. 14. 
For the Lapangan Banteng report, see Tempo, March 27, 1982, pp. 12-15; April 3, 
1982, pp. 12-13; and April 10, 1982, pp. 12-13. Also see below, pp. 15-16.
7later become an incidents grubyug, or better yet, gumrubyug, that unmistakable 
thunder of crowds on the move, that uncertain point when the attractive everyday 
pleasure of ikut-ikutan, of "just tagging along" on a Saturday night escapade, for 
instance, gathers an irreversible momentum and moves toward an obsession all its 
own. By the end of the first campaign week in April, this haunting, audible 
sense of Javanese political movement was rumored nightly in almost every street 
gossip spot in Solo.
*  *  *
The following Sunday, April 11, was clearly PDI's; there would be no cam­
paign scheduling mix-up this time. At a central point on Slamet Riyadi, almost in 
front of Hotel Cakra, a great reviewing stand was constructed for the day's 
visiting PDI national officials. The stand's rigid scaffold structure, erected on a 
spot just a stone's throw from the previous Sunday’s Cakra Incident, appeared to 
counter grubyug politics. For above all else, the imposing stand did not move.
As before, truckloads of campaigners flanked by loose squads of motorcycles 
roared past. But this Sunday, there were no breaks in the noisy political 
trafficking on Slamet Riyadi. The army and police were outnumbered by PDI 
youth who joined in pushing back the enormous crowds of spectators pressed 
along the six mile campaign route. After an hour, an amplified and unnervingly 
familiar sound emerged from the noise:
It is written in the book Ramayana that in the country of Northern 
Kuru there was no heat which was too hot, no cold too cold, no 
sweetness too sweet, no bitterness too bitter. Everything was calm, 
oh so calm. No hot, no cold, no darkness, no shining light. "Like 
unto the divine coolness and tranquility that cometh from a blessed 
cycle of heavenly waters.” In the book Ramayana it was thus stated.
Hmm. . . . But a country like this cannot become a Great Country 
because there is no . . . "UP and DOWN, UP and DOWN!" The 
Struggle is not there. All is cool and calm. Enjoy but don't enjoy 
too much; and don't be too sad. That's it, calm, calm in Northern 
Kuru. Do you want to become a People like that? No! We don’ t 
want to become a People like that. We want to become One People, 
forged together by the conditions, every day. Forged, almost crushed 
to bits. Rise up again! Forged, almost crushed to bits. Rise up 
again!
The voice, blasting from a slow-moving becak through a well-distorted loudspeaker 
like the kind used for daily mobile movie ads, was that of the late Sukarno. In 
this 1982 campaign parade, the old taped speech recalled the restless, spirited 
zaman politik, the so-called "political era" when a plethora of political parties 
campaigned vigorously in 1955. Flanked by a familiar large portrait of Indonesia's 
first president, the speech also brought to mind "The Struggle" and the hopeful 
"zaman Revolusi" when Indonesia’s political independence was proclaimed in 1945. 
But indirectly, the impassioned "political" sound of the speech recalled the threat­
ening sense that "politik" has acquired since 1965. "Politik" is something to be 
marked out and then observed, from a safe, well-defined distance. The reviewing 
stand officials stood, applauded, and waved three fingers for PDI.
The long parade of PDI people moved slowly, taking three hours to pass. The 
marchers were predominantly young and male, costumed in black T-shirts, jeans, 
and red bandanna headbands. But most also wore some reference to the zaman 
Revolusi: smudged charcoal faces with casually dangling cigarettes and "tough"
8glances; "bloody" gauze head bandages; Red-and-White Indonesian flag cloaks; 
glassless black-framed "glasses" of the bespectacled "’45 Generation"; and shirts 
printed with a black silhouette of Bung Kamo or Demokrasi. Within the ranks of 
these young "old fighters" were parts of "modern" military outfits—a white leather 
gunless holster here, a mismatched uniform there—scattered in a way suggesting 
"military" rather than identifying a specific unit. Also within the ranks were 
"traditional" powerful characters costumed in "magical" black turbans, clip-on 
beards, and temporary tattoos, or shouldering thirteen-foot boa constrictors, or 
stubbornly dressed in the old-fashioned coolie outfit of "peasants." This grand 
procession of quotations was indeed, as one PPP spectator somewhat cynically 
quipped, "a really good parade." Nevertheless, the unfortunate sight of all this 
casual revolutionary camaraderie and traditional intimacy, character after charac­
ter each just out of arm’s reach from the next, trudging along in a more or less 
orderly manner, created the queer impression of a perfectly disconnected "solidar­
ity."
The primary aim of the organizers was simply that the parade keep moving. 
For a brief moment, a spirited rdyog "trance dance" troupe stopped in front of the 
reviewing stand and quickened the tempo of its enticing rhythms. Lured by the 
attraction of the masked dancers, two boys sprang from the crowd to join in. In 
a second, nervous reviewing-stand officials signaled the troupe to move on and 
make room for those that followed. Throughout the PDI’s afternoon all that 
followed, of course, were more followers, marching along behind. The familiar 
accumulative logic of ikut-ikutan was bracketed: at no other point did spectators 
rush to join the following, nor did they cheer on the procession which seemed to 
move along regularly on its own slow accord. More remarkable was the total 
absence of attempts from PDI marchers to attract new followers. There were no 
invitations to the crowd to join PDI’s ranks and no signs displaying possible 
campaign issues—the cost of education, uneven distribution of wealth, prevalence 
of corruption—which might somehow persuade voters. After following the parade 
(as, in fact, few did) to its destination, the huge grassy square (alun-alun) which 
opens out in front of both the central mosque and the old Solonese palace, one 
found no inspiring political speakers, no speakers at all, just tired marchers about 
to head off home through back streets. In front of the reviewing stand on 
Slamet Riyadi, it was as if this procession had come from nowhere and was going 
nowhere, but simply provided a temporary focus for those gazing from the street’s 
edge, as if waiting for something to happen. But nothing really happened—no 
accidents, no incidents—and the PDI officials were obviously proud.
# *  *
Although the April 11 parade had gone smoothly, the very next day the 
government ordered that the central section of Slamet Riyadi be strictly off-limits 
for all PPP and PDI campaigning. This ban covered not only mass parades, but 
even the individual display of anything that could be read as a sign of partai 
politik. The rationale for the ban was a legal convenience, a clause in Election 
Regulations that prohibited campaigning near the headquarters of one’s opposition. 
Since the Golkar office was right on Slamet Riyadi, that was that. Implicit in 
the rationale was the logic that Golkar was not actually "political" and thus no 
threat to order in the streets. Both PDI and PPP were furious, and once again 
Slamet Riyadi became a source of news and related rumors.
One story in particular preoccupied many warung during the evenings of the 
third week in April. It had been in the air for several weeks and reported
9briefly in the nationally prestigious Tempo magazine on April 3.9 Perhaps because 
the story’s protagonist was a notoriously brutal Solonese underworld figure, or 
perhaps because the story itself had already seen the light of print, it had not 
been talked about much. But the almost simultaneous suspension of Tempo's 
publishing rights and ban on Slamet Riyadi PPP/PDI campaigns suggested, it was 
argued, that something was happening in Solo, that Tempo had begun to report it, 
and that this was the story behind it: Solo’ s "Silir Incident.’’
In the early hours of March 26, so the story went, four truckloads of AMPI 
men (paramilitary ’’youth" squads organized by Golkar) pulled up at a small warung 
filled with a dozen local PDI followers. The AMPI contingent was led by Usi, a 
regionally known hood, who was manager of Solo’s most extensive and govern­
ment-supported prostitution quarter called Silir. He was also an all-round muscle 
man for Golkar. In less than a minute Usi singled out and stabbed one of the 
PDI men who, almost as fast, succeeded in fleeing with his life. Usi pursued and 
the PDI man made it to familiar territory, the maze of alleys and tight neighbor­
hoods attached to the old palace's southern walls. But here someone screamed 
"thief," and the poor man was almost clubbed to death by his eager neighbors 
before he could identify himself. The next morning, more than 3,000 PDI 
followers marched to a local police command post and demanded immediate official 
action against AMPI. Because an official decision was not offered, that night 
trucks carrying hundreds of PDI men descended on Usi’ s rather luxurious house in 
Silir, destroyed AMPI cars, and took over the house; but Usi was gone. At this 
point one middle-aged PDI organizer, a Solonese highly regarded for a talent at 
smooth easy-to-listen-to talk which almost equaled his talent at split-second 
violence, slowly persuaded the crowd that Usi had been arrested, that it was best 
to go home.
Behind the Silir story was an explosive logic: Usi was "Chinese." 10 This 
single detail made automatic sense of the mass movement against Usi, both that 
morning at the command post—when else could 3,000 march on it and not only 
get away with it, but receive a silent go-ahead to boot—and then again, that 
night in Silir. In warung conversations, the incident recalled the much celebrated 
Solo Incident of November 1980 when a minor traffic bump involving a bicyclist 
and a "Chinese" pedestrian touched off a series of violent mass actions aimed at 
local "Chinese"-owned shops, actions which within days spread throughout Central 
Java. More than any other event in Solo's recent history, the 1980 Solo 
Incident was cited during campaign rumorings to demonstrate vividly not so much 
Solo’s anti-"Chinese" attitude, but the remarkable, far-reaching forces that could 
be set off by an accident, even a small accident, when it occurs in Solo. This 
"Chinese" connection gave the Silir Incident a peculiar potency not because it 
raised issues concerning local "Chinese" business practices—indeed, Silir was 
immensely popular—but simply because it linked the current incident with the 
1980 violence. The terms of the incident in Silir remained patently political: PDI
9. Tempo, April 3, 1982, pp. 13-14. The story’s title reads: "Silir pun Ikut 
Terguncang."
10. The quotation-marked "Chinese" refers to cina, the dominant, often pejora­
tive, Indonesian term for Indonesians and resident aliens of Chinese descent.
11. When the "Solo Incident" was told as a story, it usually began with the 
accident. Accounts of the incident can be found in P. Bambang Siswoyo, Hum 
Hara Solo Semarang (Indonesia: Bakti Pertiwi, 1981); and Tempo, December
13, 1980, pp. 12-14, and 54-58.
10
versus Golkar. Usi happened to be the pivotal figure in a peculiar logic of 
accidents. It was as if the traffic accident which triggered the 1980 Solo 
incident coincided with the accidents claimed to trigger 1982 campaign incidents 
like the one in front of Hotel Cakra. Most likely this logical coincidence, 
reinforced by the supplementary coincidence of the Tempo and Slamet Riyadi bans, 
created the compelling feeling that an inevitably uncontrollable moment was close 
at hand in the Solo campaigns. The warung buzzed with references to a sa'at, an 
approaching "moment when. . . ." Whenever a campaign incident occurred without 
touching off a mass response like that of the 1980 Solo Incident, one often heard 
the phrase, durung sa'at6— it wasn't "time" yet, its "moment" had yet to come.
*  *  *
Sunday April 18 officially belonged to PPP. Again, truckloads of PPP 
followers flanked by motorcyclists roared the streets. However, since Slamet 
Riyadi was now off-limits, there was no possibility that PPP's campaign would 
dominate the city that way PDI had the previous Sunday. Perhaps because of 
this, there emerged a point of convergence, a destination: Pasar Kliwon, an old 
market area at the center of Solo's most populous "Arab" quarter and home of 
one of the city's more powerful mosques. The traffic flow itself produced a 
parade radically different from PDI's. Thousands of mobile PPP supporters, with 
crowds of spectators following along, poured into a bottleneck that becomes the 
main street through Pasar Kliwon. All of the energy that high-speed campaigning 
carries suddenly was transformed into a mass so dense that it barely moved. 
There were no costumes, police, performers, or reviewing stands; in their place, 
shouts of "Hidup Ka'bah" and "Allahu Akbar" echoed all around. The boundary 
between the street and its edges, between followers and spectators, collapsed 
jubilantly. Whole families leaned out of shuttered windows in the old second- 
story apartments that line the streets and poured religious bucketfuls of cooling 
water on those below. That morning there had been keynote speeches by PPP 
leaders from Jakarta, is By afternoon, Pasar Kliwon itself seemed to embody PPP 
when for the first, and only, time during the long 1982 campaigning in Solo, an 
entire community was somehow on the move.
Sunday April 25 and Monday the 26 presented PDI and PPP with their last 
official days of campaigning. With Slamet Riyadi still off bounds and all major 
parading past, the political parties had no alternative but to do what they had 
been doing all of April: race the streets in open trucks and tight clusters of 
motorcycles, more furiously than ever. Occasionally the noise cut across Slamet 
Riyadi, taunting the army and police in position there. Often it moved so fast it 
was impossible to make out from the blur which party was represented, if any at 
all. Often too, a lone cyclist could be spotted wearing each of the three repre­
sentative numbers, one after the other, or all at once. Now the noise could even 
be heard late at night. 13 The trucks of followers and especially the motorcyclists 
seemed to be bypassing politics; but, in fact, this represented a state of affairs 
all the more politically radical. People began to remark that this was a Saturday
12. Among the speakers was Ridwan Saidi who advised the audience: "in the 
Week of Quiet ahead, a lot of tricky 'spooks' will roam about, making power plays 
and coercing the populace. When the spooks appear and go into action, just 
scream: ThiefI Thief!" Pelita, April 24, 1982.
13. This was in spite of a ban—in effect since April 6—on night campaigns in 
Central Java.
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night affair (malem Minggon) which had exceeded itself because it was full of 
6mosi (dramatic anger, emotionality). Why emosi? Because this was politik! The 
100 cc tempest became a peculiarly political omen that questioned the reigning 
order by unquestionably disturbing the peace.
The response of the army and police to the illegal night campaign movement 
was the same as on late Saturday nights when, seasonally, Slamet Riyadi became 
an illic it  motorcycle drag strip: the police completely ignored the cyclists. 
Instead, they chased back the groups, often crowds, of onlookers accumulating 
first on one corner, then another, in episodic kucingan (cat and mouse). Reason­
ing that the cyclists were motivated by a trance-like control induced by the 
cheers of spectators, the Solonese police held the crowds, not the cyclists 
themselves, responsible. Nevertheless, given the sheer numbers of cyclists roaring 
through the streets of Solo in April 1982, the police did not really expect to 
separate the spectators from such an attraction. Thus, throughout the campaigns, 
crowds of onlookers represented a double threat to the police, army, and ulti­
mately, the New Order government. On the one hand, crowds were thought to be 
the active motivation behind a political noise which drove the cyclists on. On 
the other, crowds seemed always to be waiting for the sound of an incident that 
could be followed, gumrubyug. During the last week of April, a dozen or so army 
troops and police were stationed at every major intersection along Slamet Riyadi. 
They were conspicuously not watching campaign trucks and cycles sail past from 
all directions.
*  *  *
On the final campaign day, April 27, Golkar was slated to hold its last grand 
city-wide parade. For it Slamet Riyadi was not off bounds. Just before the 
parade, Golkar officials circulated fliers with cautionary reminders for their 
followers: "Watch out for certain groups fabricating issues meant to sabotage the 
election and discredit Golkar; look out for subversives disguised as Golkar; report 
all threats to Golkar, immediately." Now, large convoys of army troops joined the 
police already positioned on Slamet Riyadi. Solo's few ambulances and fire 
trucks, along with a sizeable collection of other official city vehicles (including 
several dump trucks), stood ready at the intersections.
The motorcyclists and marchers who led the parade were noticeably different 
from those of the PDI and PPP movements. Golkar’ s T-shirt uniforms were 
spanking new, white, and carried along by pairs of spotless sneakers, thousands, 
padding down Slamet Riyadi in muffled triumph. There was little precision but 
extreme order in these ranks of civil servant-plus-families. They carried a banner 
which proclaimed Parade of Development and announced the floats that followed. 
Large flow charts designed to demonstrate the Fertile Society’ s graphic success 
passed by, as did Mitsubishi minibus-loads of women—Golkar Women: Pillars of the 
State. Golkar youth in new pickups displayed placards with formulaic commands, 
the same ones that dominate daily headlines: "We must (Kita harus! Haruslah! ) . . . 
preserve, conserve, implant, improve, etc., the culture, the order, the spirit, the 
character, etc.!" A car-length cardboard pencil pointed out that Education is 
Important. A papier-mach6 mosque appeared with women in pious costume and a 
sign: Golkar Respects All Religions, Especially Islam. A traditional wedding with 
ceremony-in-progress followed: Golkar Respects Traditional Customs. Papier-mach€ 
schools, electric plants, ideal hospitals, and waste-disposal systems passed by, too, 
along with all the other departments dutifully representing Development as well as 
Father Development, Suharto himself. Except for a couple of clowns from Solo’s 
failing wayang wong troupe, there was little in the procession that really excited
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the spectators. Not until torrential rains intervened was there much action, as 
army troops, police, and Golkar officials rushed to the aid of paper floats in 
distress. An entire Sugar Factory began to dissolve, then split lengthwise, and 
finally just slid off into the street behind the truck that had been carrying it. 
Within hours, the 1982 campaigns came to an official end in Solo, rains or no 
rains.
That night, the eve of the Week of Quiet, the rains cleared and campaigners 
were busy again; but now they were tearing down the thousands of posters that 
had accumulated everywhere, from neighborhood WC’s to Slamet Riyadi billboards, 
over the six-week campaign schedule. This political clean-up (pembersihan) was 
carried out with unusual enthusiasm. One energetic group of men followed 
another in removing all signs of the campaigns, all traces of politik. By morning, 
many posters had disappeared as miraculously fast as they had first appeared in 
mid-March. In their place, the theme tenang (quiet, calm) filled newspapers:
Today we enter into the Week of Quiet after enduring a 45-day 
campaign period and before Election Day on May 4.
The Week of Quiet is meant to calm ourselves and clear the air 
so that we can calmly and with a cool head execute the national 
election.
Perhaps during the Week of Quiet we can begin an effort to 
neutral-ize [menetralisir] and then eradicate all of the results from 
the excessive acts [ekses-ekses] which occurred during the campaign­
ing, so that no mutual hate or grudges arise. 14
On the surface, Solo was, in fact, calm; but at night, new rumors of violence 
spread during what became a very gossipy week of quiet. The prime story con­
cerned the last week of the campaigns. On April 22 a PDI man wearing his 
party’s emblem stopped for gasoline at a station on off-limits Slamet Riyadi near 
the Golkar headquarters. He was confronted and shot dead, it was said, by an 
army man who claimed to be protecting the headquarters from arson. During the 
funeral for the victim the next day, PDI pall bearers spotted an army man 
aggressively approaching the procession. It was rumored that the crowd turned 
on the man and chased him down an alley where he was hacked to death with 
hand sickles. This, it was reckoned, accounted for the heavy turnout of the army 
at the final Golkar parade on the 27th. Scores of other rumored incidents 
followed: stories of collisions, threats, and confrontations. But just before 
election day, a final, brief rumor circulated. Its very simplicity signaled an end 
to all stories: sa'at6 wis liwat, the "moment” had passed.
* * *
Except for the occasional sound of army trucks, on election day the streets 
of Solo were absolutely still. As one newspaper reported, even the WTS, the 
Women of Damaged Morals, were not to be found. It was often remarked that 
the vacated city recalled the annual Lebaran ritual holiday when all markets are 
closed and millions of Indonesians have returned to their village homes at the 
very end of the Muslim fasting month, to beg forgiveness from elders and social 
superiors. Like Lebaran, too, was the scene within neighborhoods where small 
groups of people, mostly families, were dressed up and strolling to and from local 
destinations. At the 869 polling stations scattered throughout Solo, a steady and 
controlled traffic of voters flowed in and out, past army troops positioned at each
14. Kompas, April 29, 1982.
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entrance. Inside, men and women voters customarily divided and sat on opposite 
sides of the room, chatting quietly, as if this were a traditional ritual reception. 
With the regularity of an Indonesian bank or apothecary, names were called and 
the summoned voter entered a cloaked booth to nyoblos (pierce) one of the three 
party emblems on the paper ballot, before slipping it into the locked ballot box. 
By 2 p.m. the voting was finished. Although officially encouraged, very few 
voters stayed on to watch the ballot-counting process; the day’s orderliness itself 
seemed to indicate yet another clear victory for the government choice. In the 
end, Golkar claimed 64.3 percent of the vote nationwide. 15
More remarkable than the size of Golkar’s victory, was its uncanny regularity. 
In the three national elections sponsored by the New Order over the eleven years 
from 1971 to 1982, Golkar's national tally has varied only two percent. But most 
remarkable of all, particularly in light of the numerous grubyug movements, 
rumors of incidents, and real expectations which grew at a fantastic rate through­
out April right up until election eve, was the silent fact that the events of the 
campaign were rarely, if ever, brought up again in warung conversations. After 
election day, only a fool asked what had happened. Occasionally, he received in 
reply an "oh, seemed lively enough" or "basically, a sukses." But the likely 
response was, "nothing happened, nothing at all." The anticipated moment had 
simply passed by: any momentum which might have been read into the April 
events in Solo, went unrealized. To the extent that the election itself recalled 
the campaign anticipations, even it too was soon forgotten. From the streetside 
perspective of the warung, by the end of May it was as if the whole business had 
just never happened.
The Aftermath
Although warung conversations had turned to other topics, Pemilu *82 still 
preoccupied government administrators as well as the press in the weeks after the 
election. Official ballot counts were calculated and recalculated with apparent 
precision and released with deliberate slowness. This was done, according to one 
Solonese administrator, not because the technology for quick calculation was 
missing, but because the government wanted to protect the masses from the 
possible "shock" of a sudden surprise. Such a shock, it was maintained, might 
start people talking again.
While the exact figures of Golkar’ s success were being registered, local 
government officials focused their attention on the final ceremonies of the long 
election period. During the week or so that followed election day, syukuran— 
rites devoted to expressing thanks to God and all others involved in the success­
ful completion of a task, usually a ritual task—were held by most administrative 
levels of government, from top to bottom. Thus, as the Indonesian newspaper 
Sinar Harapan reported: on May 8 at Solo’ s city hall
there took place a syukuran and ”sungsumann . . . because the Pemilu
had taken place in an orderly and smooth fashion. Mayor Sukatmo
15. PPP received 27.8 and PDI 7.9 percent nationwide, down from 29,3 and 8.6 
percent, respectively, in 1977. In the 1982 DPR, the military government con­
trolled 342 of 460 seats. PPP gained 94 and PDI 24 seats, down from 99 and 29 
in 1977. In Solo, Golkar claimed 55.5 percent of the vote, PPP 17.8, and PDI 26.8 
percent. Golkar’ s increase from 51,2 percent in 1977 was at the expense of PDI 
which fell from 31.5 percent in 1977. Suryadinata, Political Parties and the 1982 
General Election, pp. 76 and 80*
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explained that the Pemilu was over now and that the previously 
tense, heated atmosphere must be removed. . . .
Syukuran also took place in the outlying areas. The District 
office in Sukoharjo held one two days after election day, at the same 
time that the army troops assigned to that area were dismissed.
In addition, the Subdistrict head of Kartosuro, Drs. Suharto 
Hartoto, held a syukuran which continued with an intimate evening 
shared by the Political Parties, Golkar, Election officials, and army 
company and platoon troops. The syukuran was entertained by 
dancing and singing.
In neighborhoods, the syukuran were smaller, more local affairs. 1B
The quotation-marked "sungsuman" (bone marrow porridge) referred the news­
paper’s readers to a predominantly Javanese custom usually tied to a syukuran 
held at the conclusion of more complex domestic rituals, like weddings, which 
draw heavily on the labor of neighbors and kin. Ritually consumed, the marrow 
porridge is meant to restore strength and knit together social fractures which 
may have occurred during the concluded ritual’s often extensive preparation. In a 
single word, "sungsuman’’ reread the entire election event as an enormous, 
successfully completed ritual task. In mid May, after the syukuran, sungsuman, 
and evenings of formal "intimacy" were over, the army troops departed and 
"normal" life (kehidupan normal) returned to the Solo area.
In Jakarta, exactly one week after election day, Kopkamtib Chief Laksamana 
Sudomo summoned the chairmen of Golkar, PPP, and PDI to give ceremonial 
thanks to President Suharto for successfully organizing the "great task" (karya 
besar), Pemilu '82. Then, in a Lebaran-like gesture, each of the three chairmen 
"offered his deepest apologies to the entire Indonesian people for any possible 
excessive promotion of his respective party/group during the campaign period." 17 
In return, Sudomo thanked the chairmen (whom he referred to as "contestants") 
for their help in making the election aman (secure), tertib (orderly), and lancar 
(smooth running). Finally, in a peculiar show of gratitude, the Kopkamtib Chief 
pinned "medals" on each of the three contestants: PPP's chairman was awarded a 
Golkar emblem, Golkar one of PDI, and PDI one of PPP. With this formal 
symbolic exchange, Pemilu was ceremonially finished.
*  *  *
There was, however, another part of the general Pemilu process still to be 
completed. At one point in the awards ceremony, PPP Chairman J. Naro com­
mented that, although the campaign "storm" was over, there still remained a 
"sprinkling" of ill feelings which, if neglected, might bring on a "chronic ailment." 
Naro appealed to the Kopkamtib chief to act as the "doctor" on the case. 
Sudomo responded by placing an imaginary stethoscope to his ears; in fact, the 
operation was already in progress. Naro’ s request concerned the resolution of 
cases involving persons arrested during campaign disturbances. Because many of 
the arrested suspects were said to be PPP followers, the party chairman appar­
ently wanted to clear his party of official responsibility and, at the same time,
16. Sinar Harapan, May 12, 1982. Syukuran were by no means limited to Solo. 
For the Yogya area, see Kedaulatan Rakyat, May 17, 1982. In Jakarta, Gen. Eddie 
Nalapraya "entertained" local Islamic officials with a syukuran. See Kompas, 
May 15, 1982.
17. Ibid.
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display some concern for those arrested. One week later, Sudomo issued an 
official statement that all "ekses-ekses" which occurred during the 1982 Pemilu, 
would be taken care of by the end of May.
Of the numerous 1982 campaign ekses(es) like that in front of Solo's Hotel 
Cakra, it was the March 18 "Lapangan Banteng Incident" in Jakarta that received 
the broadest national attention and most extensive official response. Its detailed 
coverage suggested the complex stakes contained in the notion "ekses." The 
incident had occurred during a massive Jakarta Golkar rally when shouts of 
"Hidup Golkar" suddenly were countered by hurling rocks and "Hidup Ka'bah"s. 
Before army reinforcements were able to disperse the crowds, Golkar's perform­
ance stage was in flames and cars, buses, and stores near the rally site were 
destroyed. At first, the press attributed this incident of ekses to the heat of the 
day, the size of the crowd, and the sway of rock star and Golkar entertainer 
Elvie Sukaesih's hips. Tempo concluded its initial report with: "perhaps because 
they were hungry, hot, disappointed, as well as frustrated that noonday, in the 
middle of a crowd crammed onto a field increasingly narrow. Amok."i8 This was, 
after all, the "campaign season" (musim kampanye), a stormy time of periodic 
politik when crowds of people are easily carried away. Of the 318 arrested, 
mostly school kids, 274 were released because they were, in Sudomo's words, just 
"ikut-ikutan"—just following the others, tagging along.
While the ikut-ikutan rationale initially made sense of the incident, the fact 
that forty or so suspects were still under arrest raised new questions: were they 
somehow behind the incident, or were they themselves manipulated by an invisible 
character in back of it all? In short, was there a "dhalang"? At follow-up press 
conferences with the Kopkamtib Chief, reporters pursued rumors that the incident 
was the result of "pemainan politik," a political game directed by someone off 
stage. Was PPP implicated? Sudomo answered that he had already contacted 
PPP's chairman, Naro, and that it was quite possible that the characters involved 
in the incident acted on their own, independent of party policy. Was then the 
government's own Minister of Information Ali Moertopo implicated? "Take pity on 
my good friend the Minister," responded Sudomo, holding Moertopo's hand at the 
press conference. 18 Thus, Tempo's second report on the incident began: "The 
Lapangan Banteng Incident—the turbulence during Golkar's campaign on March 
18~in fact still overshadowed the campaign after two weeks. This was felt most 
in Jakarta: rumors spread continuously." 20
The constant rumors of a "dhalang" countered the threatening sense that the 
campaign crowds had moved of their own accord and were themselves the ultimate 
source of the Lapangan Banteng ekses. Most of the arrested—but not all—were 
said to be ikut-ikutan, unwitting followers of a script possibly directed by 
someone else. And yet, this "someone else" was never identified; the question 
never grew into a full-blown incident of its own. No sooner had Sudomo opened 
the possibility of a dhalang, than he seemed to close it by maintaining constant 
contact with PPP's Naro and the government's Moertopo. Even those eventually
18. Tempo, March 27, 1982, p. 15. The report also commented: "This 'anarki' was 
rather different from the January 15, 1974 Incident. In that incident eight years 
ago, the motives and targets were clear. Anti-foreign investment, especially 
Japanese, anti-luxury. But in the actions taken by the angry kids this time, it 
was not clear what they wanted other than to destroy cars and shops" (p. 14).
19. Tempo, April 10, 1982, p. 12.
20. Ibid., April 3, 1982, p. 12.
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brought to trial were not accused of directing the disturbances. What emerged 
from the incident was a general sense of "ekses" which conflated the two 
rationales for interpreting political disturbances—the campaign season's turbulent 
ikut-ikutan forces on the one hand, and pemainan politik's invisible dhalang-like 
authority on the other. The two rationales were fitted together into a circular 
logic which ran more or less as follows: a stormy political climate is created by 
certain politically motivated characters taking advantage of a stormy political 
climate. With this, the charged political implications of the sense that crowds or 
rumors were moving on their own, were short-circuited. What was produced and 
what remained, unsurprisingly, was "ekses," as a natural precipitation in campaign 
seasons. Thus, Sudomo had already opened his Crisis Control Center (Pusat 
Pengadalian Krisis or Pusdalsis) "hotline" two days before the Lapangan Banteng 
incident. Similarly, two months later the Kopkamtib Chief could expect that all 
Pemilu ekses-ekses business would be "finished" by the end of May. But it was 
the most invisible authority of the entire election period, Suharto himself, who 
underscored the very regular place that cases of ekses have in New Order 
politics. Without interrupting his normal Pemilu silence, the off-stage president 
issued a brief statement through Vice President Adam Malik: "The Lapangan 
Banteng Incident is just an ordinary kind of case and already under control. " 21
The term "ekses" had been around for some time before the 1982 election. 
As Ken Ward pointed out, it was one of a number of expressions developed in 
1971 by Golkar's Bapilu (Body for Managing the General Election—an Ali Moertopo 
creation) to counter charges of Golkar steamrollering. These expressions
gained immense popularity in 1971: ekses, overacting, and less con­
cretely, issue. An issue is an accusation or insinuation which one's 
opponents may make but which friends and independent onlookers 
would do well to disbelieve. Any violence that occurred in the form 
of intimidation of party members was then either an issue raised by 
the parties to "discredit" Golkar, or could be attributed to mere 
excess of zeal on the part of local activists who were given a new 
organization with orders to swell its membership rapidly. Such 
overzealousness thus produced overacting which, however regrettable, 
should not be allowed to obscure the ideals Golkar really stood for. 
Similarly, once any intimidation that took place was recognized to be 
no more than an ekses, Golkar's image need not be considered tar­
nished. 22
In 1982, the terms "issue" and "overacting" operated in the same way as in 1971: 
the former turned all criticism of Golkar into sheer slander, while the latter 
excused intimidation by Golkar as mere enthusiasm. The meaning of "ekses," 
however, had shifted. Its reach had extended to include not only Golkar over­
enthusiasm, but in a sense, all Pemilu overenthusiasm, especially that of the two 
political parties. Thus, by extension "ekses" grew to cover "politik": all campaign 
disturbances, be they seasonal ikut-ikutan movements or seasoned pemainan 
politik, came to have an almost natural feel in the increasingly familiar new order 
of things. As "ekses-ekses," incidents were responded to as if they were not sur­
prising—just ordinary cases already under control. Thoroughly expected of 
campaign seasons, "ekses" has a sort of built-in retrospect which "takes care of 
things" before their time, as if they have already happened.
21. Ibid., March 27, 1982, p. 13.
22. Ward, 1971 Elections in Indonesia, pp. 50-51.
Sea of People at the Golkar Campaign Rally, Lapangan Banteng, Jakarta
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While "ekses" represents campaign incidents, it also reflects what it is not. 
Reporting on Golkar's April 25 final campaign parade in Jakarta, Sudomo noted 
that it was "performed extraordinarily well—orderly, smooth running, and very 
regulated. All of the participants in the parade obeyed the rules." 23 He then 
went on to report, "regretfully," that all along the edge of the campaign route, 
there occurred disturbances which, when totaled, left 6 dead, 97 wounded, and 130 
arrested. 24 More than any other, this last incident of the campaign period high­
lighted the contrast between ekses and its mirror opposite: in the face of ekses, 
emerges sukses. Constructed contrastively, sukses embodies all that ekses is not 
and appears as an ideal model of order. Confronted with disturbances along its 
edges, the Golkar parade was an extraordinary sukses because its participants 
remained undisturbed, followed the rules, and obediently exemplified discipline and 
order (tata tertib). But equally significant to its construction, sukses is attained 
by actively removing the ekses-ekses that face it. On April 25, this meant 6 
dead, 97 wounded, and 130 arrested. In the process, sukses displays an ideal 
model for ordering. Thus, Pemilu involves more than just a calculated risk on the 
part of the government. In the New Order, it represents a somewhat sinister 
application of Clifford Geertz's classic formula for religious performance in which 
rituals are "not only models of what they believe, but also models for the 
believing of it." 25 Already apparent, victory is secured, repeatedly.
After the election, Solo's own Javanese newspaper Dharma Kandha completed 
its Pemilu '82 reportage with the summary headline: "Indonesian People Really 
Politically Conscious: GOLKAR VICTORY ABSOLUTE, POLITICAL PARTIES 
'DYNAMIC.'" The story's lead-off paragraph read:
The People are amazed and exclaim, "Gee, the election was just 
like Lebaran; everyone together, old and young, men and women, 
dressed up in their very best; almost no shops, warung, or restaurants 
open; all freely and gladly joining in the celebration of Pemilu. It 
really was like a Pesta Demokrasi! If one followed the campaign 
events, one fe lt  insecure; but when Election Day arrived, everything 
really was different and ran smoothly and sukses-fully. If that's the 
case, now the Indonesian People really are politically conscious." 2B
In its customary familial style, Dharma Kandha quoted an imaginary exclamation 
as if it had been heard in the "streets." If one followed the campaign events, 
"one fe lt  insecure [rasan6 ati kaya kaya miris]." But with election day, everything 
really was different. "It really was like [temenan, kaya] a Pesta Demokrasi." By 
1982, Pemilu had emerged as a ritual model which, with sukses, could be lived up 
to. In performing Pemilu, the official roles were unmistakable: Golkar’ s victory is 
absolute while the two political parties are, in a word, "dynamic."
23. Suara Karya, April 27, 1982.
24. Two days later, Sudomo gave orders to "shoot on the spot" anyone caught 
obstructing Pemilu '82, "especially on May 4th," election day. Sinar Harapan, 
April 28, 1982.
25. Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation of Culture (New York: Basic Books, 1973), 
p. 114.
26. Dharma Kandha, Minggu Ke-III May 1982. The Javanese headline reads: 
"Rakyat Indonesia Sadhar Politik Temenan: GOLKAR MENANG MUTLAK, PARPOL 
DINAMIS." I am grateful for Nancy Florida's suggestions on this translation and 
other passages in the article.
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*  *  *
It is not surprising that Indonesian and foreign observers of Pemilu have 
noted—with varying degrees of official pride, dismissive cynicism, and academic 
curiosity—Pemilu's ritual-like appearance. Indeed, Pemilu *82 was promoted essen­
tially as a ritual: a Lebaran-like "Pesta Demokrasi" perceived by local administra­
tors as a colossal domestic ceremony, a national life-cycle rite. In addition, 
recognizable "traditional rituals" (upacara tradisional)— syukuran and sungsuman, 
for example—were present, as were their equally recognizable bureaucratic 
counterparts—opening/closing ceremonies (upacara pembukaan/penutup). By 
extension, many of the events specific to Pemilu—parades, Weeks of Quiet, voting 
days—attained a certain ceremonial feel in 1982 because of the increasing 
regularity of the Pemilu process itself. Even the campaign incidents, when 
identified as "ekses," fit into the general formula of "sukses" by which Pemilu ’82 
was processed and "normal life" restored, ritually. 27 in Solo, that the campaign 
incidents were rarely mentioned again in warung conversations after election eve, 
invites such an interpretation. If the rumored incidents had been politically 
motivated rather than just a regular part of the Pemilu process, where, then, did 
all the momentum go?
The problem with this kind of ritual interpretation, however compelling it may 
be, is that such a reading tends to de-"politicize" its subject. What is lost by 
treating Pemilu as if it were a ritual, is the sense that Pemilu is political, in 
part, precisely because it is treated by the New Order government as a ritual. A 
ritual interpretation of Pemilu—by New Order officials and foreign observers 
alike—carries with it, willy-nilly, certain political consequences. Deeply rooted in 
its own conventional assumptions of cultural order, anthropological interpretation 
of "ritual" often tilts in favor of, well, sukses.
On the streets of Solo during the 1982 campaigns, one had the dramatic sense 
that something else, something other than the ritual restoration of order, was also 
at stake. Although the presence of army troops along Slamet Riyadi might have 
been taken as a sign of order, these "security" (keamanan) forces, in fact, 
signaled just the opposite, order's absence, no matter how calm (aman) everything 
occasionally appeared. This sense of another reality, behind or beyond calm
27. Responding to the 1977 election with "The Indonesian Elections: A National 
Ritual" (in Man, Meaning and History, ed. R. Schefold, J. W. Schoorl, and J. 
Tennekes [The Hague: Nijhoff, Verhandelingen van het Koninklijk Instituut voor 
Taal-, Land-, en Volkenkunde, vol. 89, 1980], pp. 179-203), anthropologist N. G. 
Schulte Nordholt asks: "What is the use of these elections if by all means of 
manipulations the results are fixed anyway?" (p. 179). Through an analysis of 
symbols rooted "in the 'cosmic order' of Old Java"—symbols drawn from tradi­
tional classificatory systems of pre-Hindu Javanese society, Javanese mystical 
beliefs on the relationship between subject and divine monarchy, and no less a 
monument to cosmic order than the Borobudur itself—Schulte Nordholt argues that 
"the national elections might be seen as 'a rite with the purpose of restoring the 
wholeness of chaotic society and nature.' The chaos which had become manifest 
in a terrifying way during the campaign had to be overcome" (p. 181), In 1982 
terms: "sukses" reigns, as "ekses" is overcome. Meanwhile, in the midst of the 
1982 campaigns, Far Eastern Economic Review's cover story reasoned that 
"religious and primordial symbols overshadow political debate." FEER, April 23, 
1982, pp. 24-29.
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appearances, was sharpened during the campaign, but by no means particular to it. 
Tied to the New Order's concern with keamanan, is its program of pembangunan 
(development, construction); in a state of keamanan, pembangunan is supposed to 
grow. But, here too exists the sense of another reality, represented nightly on 
national television evening pembangunan reports, where the scenes of model 
neighborhoods and villages on the screen never match up with local scenes, no 
matter how much pembangunan appears to have been implemented. Slogans of 
"keamanan" and "pembangunan" are so much a part of everyday life in Solo, that 
the difference between what they are signs of and what they are not, is almost 
transparent. A sense of difference remains; it is just terribly familiar. During 
Pemilu, it becomes acute. Like the army keamanan troops, Golkar-Solo's April 27 
pembangunan parade stood for what it was not. Not until the rains fell, did the 
crowds of spectators begin to show some excitement.
Probably because of their very familiarity, these differences were not what 
was discussed in warung during the campaign period. Instead, rumors of the 
numerous campaign incidents dominated conversations. Unlike Jakarta, there was 
little newspaper coverage of local incidents. The government is normally sensitive 
about news reports of "regional" incidents. However, it has been unusually 
cautious concerning Solo, not permitting branch offices or local editions of major 
newspapers in the city. Essentially all that remain are the weekly ritual pro­
nouncements of Dharma Kandha (and its Indonesian counterpart Dharma Nyata) on 
the one hand, and the warung stories on the other, which combine to produce an 
extraordinarily split-image view of Pemilu events. Without newspapers to cover 
the local incidents as "ekses"--be it campaign amok or political dhalangry—rumors 
of incidents in Solo moved on, gathering a momentum of their own. (It was not 
until Tempo was banned, that its atypical coverage of the "Silir Incident" as well 
as the magazine itself, became a warung topic.) Like the campaign motorcycles, 
once in gear, the rumors too seemed to be heading somewhere, to another point 
beyond the political traffic on Slamet Riyadi, towards a "moment"—a sa'at.
The mid-April emergence of the notion of a "sa'at" brought with it an almost 
contradictory half-vision of what might lie ahead. Torn loose from the relatively 
domesticated identification of the Indonesian "ikut-ikutan," the Javanese "gum- 
rubyug" movements echoed the accelerating sense of direction rumored as sa'at. 
Embodying the sound of crowds on the move, gumrubyug directly opposed the 
logic of keamanan troops whose power rests in their ability to represent what is 
not present~the authority of the government on the one hand, and the "secured 
calm" on the other. At a stand-off with gumrubyug, the troops stationed on the 
street corners during the last week of April seemed to have little to do other 
than not watch campaigners roar by. The real threat of crowds on the move is 
that they suddenly will turn on you. No less a keamanan trooper than Sudomo 
himself commented: "The climate of that 'crowd} is what made my hair turn white. 
. . . Whether it's called Malari, Lapangan Banteng, or whatever, the 'crowd' 
always makes me nervous."28 But the Javanese "gumrubyug" did not understand 
the significance of the English loan-trope "crowd," as it headed towards its sa'at 
in Solo.
The other side of the vision accompanying rumors of a sa’at, was total lack 
of movement: macet—stalled, stuck, conked out. For the government, "macet" 
represents a general fear that the bureaucracy's chain of command will break 
down; but more specifically, it signals the moment when economic wheels stop
28. Tempo, March 27, 1982, p. 18. Sudomo himself used the English word 
"crowd."
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turning. Just after the Lapangan Banteng incident, it was reported: "Jakarta 
Economic Activity 'Macet Total,* 240 Persons Arrested."29 Together, this unlikely 
combination of threats—gumrubyug and macet—struck at the heart of New Order 
logic by simultaneously overriding keamanan and stalling pembangunan.
During the campaigns, it was the duty of army troops and police along the 
borders of parade routes to hold back the crowds of spectators, lest they gum- 
rubyug. The job of parade officials, however, was to keep things moving. Just 
after the ban on Slamet Riyadi "political party" parading, the unusual official-less 
April 18 PPP parade slowly transformed itself into the dense mass that merged 
with Pasar Kliwon. But, most campaign marchers—even the April 11 PDI reyog 
troupe—normally followed orders to move on and avoid macet. 30 These regulated 
flows of campaign followers mirrored the government's ideal image of the overall 
Pemilu process: lancar—not speeding, not idle, but smooth running. On the 
streets of Solo, the ideal counterimage was the sight of a motorcycle whizzing 
past, its young rider reclining back, perfectly relaxed, and posed as a still-life 
portrait of taking it easy, santai at 100 kph.
As the "moment" seemed closer at hand, there emerged from warung rumors 
the peculiar sense that the smooth-running process of Pemilu would macet. This 
sense carried all the fascination of an enormous political traffic accident. 31 An 
explicitly "political" victory—that PPP or PDI would actually win—was never 
discussed, nor was the language of "victory" ever used. Instead, the rumors' 
momentum suggested that the election process itself would suddenly break down 
and election day would have to be bypassed. On election eve, when word spread 
in the warung that the "moment" has passed, it anticipated a silence in the weeks 
to come. Although the post-Pemilu press overflowed with reports on the election 
period—its results, highlights, incidents, and measures of political consciousness— 
warung conversations shifted to other stories. Unmentioned was sukses; but this 
was not new. Absent too, were the campaign stories. Unlike the official press,
29. Jurnal Ekuin, March 20, 1982.
30. That r4yog troupes—once the signal of non-"order," as well as active recruit­
ers for PKI and PNI in 1955—should now follow orders, represents the height of 
domestication. In fact, for some groups orders were not even necessary, as 
Tempo's report on an East Jakarta PDI rally indicates: "The Ponorogo reyog group 
which at first had entertained the crowds, quickly stopped its deafening noise, 
without orders, when PDI Secretary General Sabam Sirait appeared at the podium. 
But the mood was still enthusiastic. . . ." Tempo, March 27, 1982, p. 12.
31. Long after Pemilu '82 was over, a crowd of spectators formed along the wide 
street in front of Solo's main post office. The spectators were waiting for the 
accidents which came, one after another in quick succession, as motorcyclists lost 
control and hit the pavement, swerved into other traffic, or just skidded off the 
road. There was an oil spill. No one attempted to warn the approaching cyclists 
or to stop them; that seemed to be taken care of by the oil. Even the policeman 
who had just dropped onto the oil with his white Honda, joined the rest of the 
spectators. I left, for fear of blood; but now, I doubt whether that was at stake 
in the scene, in spite of its inevitability. Instead, the image of all these 
shooting-gallery ducks going down without a single shot fired, was probably a 
sweetly amusing alternative to aman-tertib-lancar: a moment when the machine 
slips on its own oil. In this light, it is significant that the 130 spectators 
arrested during the April 25 Golkar parade in Jakarta, were accused (among other 
charges) of smearing the streets with oil. (See Kompas, April 27, 1982.)
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the warung now had no real interest in these incidents. Not to talk of rumored 
incidents past, was not to see them, in retrospect, as ekses, and in a sense, not 
to see them at all. This unconcerned, utterly casual silence was at perfect odds 
with the post-Pemilu "political" soul searching and consciousness raising of the 
government and press. It seemed to confirm suspicions that, while Pemilu was a 
sukses, voters were somehow not really politically conscious. "Did the masses 
consciously give their support to a particular Pemilu contestant?" asked Topik 
magazine. 38 Warung conversations did not worry much over this question. When 
"Pemilu" was raised in warung in the last weeks of May 1982, it was with 
reference to Pemilu *87. A last whisper of rumors wondered whether the two 
"political parties" would be active in 1987; who might lead themj and what would 
happen if the parties were abandoned, or if they weren’ t. The rumors did not 
last long, but they signed the possibility of another sa’at.
One of the striking facts about Pemilu(s) is that the most active campaigners 
are kids in their teens and early twenties. They now belong to a New Order 
generation born after 1965 and trained in New Order schools. And yet, they are 
the ones most frequently criticized as thoroughly undisciplined and politically 
unconscious. Juxtaposed to the relatively recent ascent of Pemilu to its ritual 
status, this unruly fact suggests a rather weird coincidence of histories in 1987: 
that of a "Pesta Demokrasi ’87" on the one hand, and (for lack of a better term) 
an "’87 Generation" on the other. If the logic of sa’at repeats itself, Pemilu ’87 
may secure its "ritual" position as a Pesta Demokrasi. Then again, Pemilu ’87 
could very well follow out sa'at's compelling logic, and ritually exceed itself. In 
any event, looking back now on the 1982 General Election in Solo, Ken Ward’s 
initial thought holds true: "Historical events often seem more important to their 
witnesses than they do to the historians who judge them later." The same could 
be said of rituals and their ethnographers.
32. Topik, May 10, 1982, p. 5
